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Singular Thought
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I—TIM CRANE
THE SINGULARITY OF SINGULAR THOUGHT
A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at
just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to
the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that epi-
sodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are
directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that
do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
I
Singular Terms and Singular Thought. In Word and Object, Quine
contrasts general and singular terms, and defines a general term as
one which is ‘true of each, severally, of any number of objects’
(1960, pp. 90–1). But as he goes on to point out, the number of ob-
jects in question is not what really matters to the singular–general
contrast: ‘natural satellite of the earth’ is a general term though true
of just one object. What matters is rather that a singular term is one
that ‘purports to refer to just one object’ (1960, p. 96). The diction-
ary defines ‘to purport’ as ‘to appear or claim to be or do something,
especially falsely’. Putting this definition together with Quine’s, we
can say that a singular term is one that (as it were) appears or
‘claims’ to be doing something—referring to just one object—and
still appears or ‘claims’ to be doing such a thing even if it is false that
it is doing it: that is, even if there is no one object it refers to.
Purporting, of course, is a metaphor: words do not literally pur-
port (or claim) to do anything. Quine says that ‘such talk of purport
is only a picturesque way of alluding to distinctive grammatical
roles that singular and general terms play in sentences. It is by gram-
matical role that general and singular terms are properly to be dis-
tinguished’ (1960, p. 96). But the significance of the word ‘purport’
remains: a term can have the grammatical role of a singular term
even if it fails to refer to just one object.
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It is widely accepted that just as there are general and singular
terms, there are general and singular thoughts.1 Following Quine’s
remarks, we can say that a singular thought is one that purports to re-
fer to just one object. Preserving the connotations of ‘purport’, then
we can say in addition that such a thought can do this even if there is
no such object, and therefore no such reference. Now, like words,
thoughts do not literally purport or claim anything. But just as we
can spell out the metaphor of a term’s purporting in terms of its
grammatical role, so it is natural to spell out the idea of a singular
thought ‘purporting to refer’ in terms of its cognitive role. And if we
take the connotations of ‘purporting’ seriously, then a thought can be
singular even if it fails to refer to just one object, so long as it has the
cognitive role associated with thoughts that succeed in so referring.
The word ‘thought’ can be used to refer both to episodes of think-
ing and to the content of such an episode—where the content is
what is thought (or judged, hoped for, imagined, etc.). Frege (1920)
used the word Gedanke (thought) in this latter way, and it also
makes sense in English to say that someone is expressing, or under-
standing, or trying to grasp a thought. This is ‘thought’ in the sense
of content of thought. The content of a thought is normally taken to
be a proposition—that is, something assessable as true or false—
and that is how I shall understand it here.2 There is a sense, then, in
which propositions are thoughts. But it is also correct to use the
term ‘thought’ for the episode of thinking something—if I talk
about a thought that I had yesterday, then I am talking about an ep-
isode, since only they (rather than their contents) can have temporal
location. In this sense, judgements themselves are thoughts, and
their contents are propositions.
So if we want to talk about a thought’s ‘purporting to refer’ we
could mean that a psychological episode is so purporting, or that
the propositional content is. But if we want to spell out ‘purporting’
in terms of the cognitive role of thoughts, then it is more natural to
think that episodes of thinking purport to refer, rather than proposi-
tions. Propositions, conceived of as abstract contents of psychologi-
cal acts, do not have cognitive roles as such; it is rather acts of
thinking which have such roles.
1 An important recent collection is Jeshion (2010b).
2 There are good reasons for treating the contents of some thoughts as non-propositional,
but these are not relevant to this debate. See Crane (2001, ch. 1).
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What is the cognitive role of a singular thought episode? As
Quine observed about singular terms, the issue is not whether the
thought happens to alight on just one object, but rather whether
there is some particular object that the thinker is aiming at when
thinking, whether they have someone particular in mind. Noticing
my wallet missing, I might think someone stole my wallet. I do not
have any particular person in mind, and the content of my thought
could be made true by the fact that a team of pickpockets staged the
theft together. But if I see a man leaving the table acting suspicious-
ly, then when I think that man stole my wallet, I am ‘aiming’ in
thought at just one object. The second thought, but not the first, is a
singular thought in the sense that will concern me here. The distinc-
tion between singular and general thought—the distinction between
having some particular object in mind and thinking about the world
without having any particular object in mind—is fundamental to
our mental lives, and any adequate theory of mind must make room
for it.
My purpose here is to sketch a conception of singular thought
which makes sense of this familiar distinction, but which also takes
seriously the idea that a singular thought might merely purport to
refer. In other words, a thinker can think about a particular object
and yet fail to refer to that object in thought. The central case I shall
discuss is the case where there really is no such object: where the ob-
ject thought about does not exist. (The other case, which I will not
discuss, is where a thinker aims to think about some particular ob-
ject but fails because there are many objects upon which his thought
alights.) I will argue that there can be genuinely singular thoughts
about objects that do not exist.
This conception of singular thought is in opposition to a domi-
nant (maybe even the orthodox) view. On what I will call this ortho-
dox view, singular thoughts are object-dependent: they depend for
their existence on the existence of the object or objects they are
about. John McDowell defines a singular thought as ‘a thought that
would not be available to be thought or expressed if the relevant ob-
ject, or objects, did not exist’ (McDowell 1982, p. 204). So it cannot
be enough, on this orthodox view, that a singular thought merely
purports to refer to just one object. The thought must also succeed
in referring to it.
The obvious advantage of the orthodox view is that it gives a sim-
ple explanation of what makes a thought singular rather than gener-
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al. The orthodoxy explains this difference by saying that the thought
ontologically depends on the existence of the particular object it is
about. The standard way to spell this out is to treat a singular
thought episode as a propositional attitude, with a singular proposi-
tion as its content. Singular propositions are then construed either in
the style of Russell—as containing the particular object they are
about—or as some followers of Frege do, as containing object-de-
pendent senses.3 The singularity of a singular thought is guaranteed
by the thought having a content which either contains or is constitu-
tively dependent on the particular object it is about. So if that object
had not existed the content would not either, and neither would the
thought episode.4
However, if there is genuinely singular thought about the non-ex-
istent, then this object-dependence thesis is false. And there do seem
to be straightforward cases where a thinker’s thought is aiming to
refer to some particular thing which does not exist. I will use a clas-
sic example that is all the better for being a real one. The term ‘Vul-
can’ was introduced in 1859 by the French astronomer Urbain Le
Verrier as a name for a planet orbiting between Mercury and the
Sun. Le Verrier had previously discovered the planet Neptune, using
much the same methods as he went on to use when hypothesizing
Vulcan. Once the name ‘Vulcan’ was introduced, those who used it
were, on the face of it, taking themselves to be talking about (and
therefore thinking about) just one object. In many ways their
thoughts are similar to thoughts about other, existing planets—
‘Vulcan might appear tonight’ seems to express a similar kind of
thought to ‘Neptune might appear tonight’, etc. Those who think
about Vulcan seem to be having thoughts that are aiming to refer to
a particular object just as the thoughts about Neptune are.
I talk here of a thought being ‘about’ something non-existent, and
that such thoughts fail to refer. I therefore distinguish (by stipula-
tion) between aboutness and reference. Reference is a relation to an
existing thing, by definition; aboutness is the mere representation of
some thing in thought, whether or not it exists. So although I can-
3 For the first option, see Kaplan (1989), Salmon (2010), Williamson (2002); for the sec-
ond, see Evans (1982), McDowell (1984). Armstrong and Stanley (forthcoming) argue con-
vincingly that having an object as a constituent is not a requirement for a proposition to be
singular in the relevant sense.
4 McDowell, for example, writes: ‘if one utters a sentence of the relevant sort, containing a
singular term that, in that utterance, lacks a denotation, then one expresses no thought at
all; consequently neither a truth nor a falsehood’ (McDowell 1982, p. 204).
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not refer to Vulcan—‘Vulcan’ is, after all, commonly called a ‘non-
referring term’—I can talk or think about Vulcan. It is possible to
regiment our ordinary talk in a different way; one could insist that it
is not possible for a thought episode to be genuinely about some-
thing non-existent, so aboutness must go with reference (see Bach
2010). But if one takes this view of ‘aboutness’ one will need some
other way of describing what I call ‘my thoughts about Vulcan’.
Someone might say, for example, that the thoughts represent Vul-
can, although they are not about it. I’d rather say my thoughts are
about Vulcan, but they do not refer to Vulcan. I hope it is obvious
that this difference is terminological.
II
Acquaintance and Object-Dependence. On the face of it, then, there
are examples of thoughts which are about a particular object, but
where that object does not exist. The defender of object-dependence
might deny that these thoughts are genuinely singular. So this is our
question: what is it for a thought to be genuinely singular? In a re-
cent paper, François Recanati defines singularism as the doctrine that
‘our thought is about individual objects as much as it is about prop-
erties’ (Recanati 2010, p. 142). But given my remarks at the end of
the previous section, this should be common ground. What is not
common ground is whether these thoughts are object-dependent.
A broad contrast can be made between psychological approaches
to the phenomenon, and epistemological or metaphysical approach-
es. When introducing the phenomenon above, I started with Quine’s
definition of a singular term and applied it to thought: a thought
that purports to refer to just one object. I then described a thought’s
‘purporting’ in terms of the thinker’s aims or intentions in referring:
the thinker is aiming their thought towards—that is, intending to
refer to—just one thing. And what matters is not that the thought
happens to refer to just one thing, but that it has a specific cognitive
role. Singularity is a matter of the cognitive—that is, the psycholog-
ical or phenomenological—role of the thought.
The orthodox approach tends to characterize singularity in more
epistemological and metaphysical terms. In a recent paper, for ex-
ample, Joshua Armstrong and Jason Stanley make the following
claim about singular thought:
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Intuitively, a singular thought about an object o is one that is directly
about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having
some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is on-
tologically dependent on o. (Armstrong and Stanley forthcoming, §1)
Armstrong and Stanley here propose two familiar conditions on
something’s being a singular thought. Their first condition is that
having a singular thought requires the thinker to stand in some spe-
cial epistemic relation to the object the thought is about. An epis-
temic relation (like any relation) can only hold between existents, so
if having a genuinely singular thought entails the existence of such
an epistemic relation, it will also entail the existence of the object of
thought (a metaphysical condition). This second (metaphysical)
condition just is the claim of object-dependence. What we were
looking for, however, is a reason to believe this claim. For this rea-
son, I will focus here on the first condition: that there is a special
epistemic relation between thinker and object. Perhaps this will give
us such a reason.
What might such a special epistemic relation be? Orthodox theo-
rists here tend to appeal to the notion of acquaintance, often with a
reference towards Russell’s famous discussion (1918). However, for
various reasons, Russell’s notion of acquaintance will not help the
orthodoxy. Russell defined ‘acquaintance’ as follows:
I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cogni-
tive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object
itself. (Russell 1918, p. 152)
It is clear from this definition that Russell is not using the English
words ‘acquainted’ in its normal sense. For in its normal sense, be-
ing acquainted with something or someone is just a matter of know-
ing it, more or less well, or being more or less familiar with it
(‘know’ here in the sense of connaître, conoscere or kennen, etc.).
And this is something like a state, or a persisting condition, not
something event-like or episodic. Yet being ‘directly aware’ of some-
thing sounds like an experience, and therefore something episodic.5
In addition, in the ordinary sense of acquaintance, the objects of
acquaintance need not be objects of singular thoughts. Visiting a for-
eign land, I might become acquainted with the local customs about
5 I owe this point to Mike Martin.
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how people eat there. But there is no question of my being able to
have singular thoughts (in any sense) about these customs. My point
here is that Russell is not appealing to an ordinary sense of ‘acquaint-
ance’; he is obviously using the term in a special technical sense.
What is this technical sense? Russell’s description of acquaintance
in terms of being ‘directly aware’ suggests that it is some kind of
perceptual relation, and some philosophers have taken acquaintance
that way (see Recanati 2010; Dickie 2010, p. 213). But in fact Rus-
sell cannot have meant that we perceive all objects of acquaintance
by means of the senses, since among the objects of acquaintance are
the self (which we do not perceive) and universals, including non-
sensible qualities and relations such as ‘relations of space and time,
similarity, and certain abstract logical universals’ (Russell 1918,
p. 109). For Russell, the relation in which you stand to these univer-
sals, yourself and to sense-data was the same—acquaintance. What
made the epistemic acts different were the relata. Russell’s account
of acquaintance is very remote, then, from the concerns of contem-
porary thinkers who like to think of acquaintance in terms of per-
ception.6
However, even if ‘acquaintance’ does mean something like sense-
perception, then it still does not follow that acquaintance is a condi-
tion of singular thought as many orthodox want it to be. One rea-
son for this is that a standard component of the orthodox view is
that I can have a singular thought about an object when I can name
it (Salmon 2010). And yet there is no reason to think that I can
name only those things I have perceived (or can perceive). So if ac-
quaintance is a necessary condition for singular thought, and we
can have singular thoughts about things we can name, then ac-
quaintance cannot be limited to perception.
Jeshion (2010a, p. 109) has proposed on behalf of the acquaint-
ance theorist that they should think of acquaintance in terms of re-
lations of perception, or of memory, or of communication. This
would allow for many thoughts which are expressed using names to
be acquaintance-based. As Jeshion makes clear, the reason why the-
orists want to insist on an acquaintance condition on singular
thought is because they want to rule out thoughts expressed using
certain special kinds of referring expressions as being genuinely sin-
6 And we should not simply use the term ‘acquaintance’ for whatever epistemic relation
makes singular thought possible: I agree here with Daly (2007).
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gular. These are, for example, thoughts expressed using ‘descriptive
names’ in Evans’s (1982) sense, or using invented devices like Kap-
lan’s ‘dthat’ (Kaplan 1989). It is not plausible that someone who
uses Kaplan’s name ‘Newman 1’ to denote the first person born in
the next century has any one person in mind or is aiming at any one
person in thought. Their thought happens to alight on someone, if
there is someone satisfying this condition—and this is the mark of a
general thought.
But just as these are clear cases of singular terms being used with-
out expressing singular thoughts, there also seem to be equally clear
cases of singular thought (in the sense of a thought aiming at a par-
ticular object) which fail to meet even the broadened acquaintance
condition. Jeshion (2010a, p. 117) makes this point effectively with a
number of examples, one of which will suffice to give the flavour of
her position. Someone who has been adopted as a child might form a
desire to meet his biological mother; he expresses his thoughts by say-
ing ‘I’d do anything to meet her’ (Jeshion 2010a, p. 117). There is a
particular person his thought is directed on or about; but there is no
acquaintance (even in the broad sense) with this person.
Notice that it does not show that the thought is ‘really’ general
that we would also say of this case, ‘he doesn’t know who she is’.
The ordinary notion of ‘knowing who someone is’ is clearly highly
context-sensitive, as many writers have noted (see e.g. Boer and
Lycan 1984; Jeshion 2010a; Taylor 2010, p. 97). Sitting at my desk,
I am asked: do I know who Tim Berners-Lee is? Of course; he is the
inventor of the World Wide Web. But if I am at a social event where
he is present, do I know who he is, in the sense of: do I know which
person here he is? Not unless I can recognize him. As a matter of
fact, I can’t recognize Sir Tim by sight, so in that context I don’t
know who he is. One can think singularly about someone even if
there are contexts in which it is true to say that one does not know
who they are.7
Jeshion’s examples show, independently of the issue of non-exist-
ence, that singularity of a thought does not depend on acquaintance
—even in a broad sense of that term. The examples of non-existent
objects like Vulcan only serve to reinforce the point. I therefore re-
ject Armstrong and Stanley’s claim that it is intuitive that a singular
7 This does not tell against the views of those philosophers, for example Evans (1982), who
have constructed accounts of thought based on a technical notion of ‘knowing which’.
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thought requires some epistemic relation to the object of thought.
What is intuitive or obvious is the distinction between general
thought and singular thought, where singularity is understood in
terms of aiming to refer in thought to some particular thing. But I
deny that it is obvious that aiming to refer in thought to some par-
ticular thing requires that one be in some special epistemic relation
with that thing.
What is obvious is that there are things and people we know bet-
ter than other things; places we know better than other places; and
the knowledge you get when recognizing something by sight (for ex-
ample) is different from the knowledge that one has when reading
about it in a book. There are many distinctions we can make be-
tween kinds of knowledge, and the thoughts we have about things
do vary depending on the ways we know these things. However, I
am sceptical that any specific way of knowing something lines up
systematically with thinking about a particular object as such.
III
De Re Thought. The phenomenon of singular thought is, it seems to
me, neither a distinctively epistemic phenomenon nor a distinctively
metaphysical one. In the previous section, I argued that there is no
reason to connect acquaintance in (some of) its various philosophi-
cal senses with the capacity to think singular thoughts. I will now
question whether there is any reason to associate a particular style
of attribution of thought with singular thought.
Many philosophers associate the idea of singular thought with
the idea of de re thought. Kenneth Taylor, for example, has written
about ‘de re or singular thought’ as if they were two terms for the
same thing. And Jeshion opens the introduction to her recent collec-
tion by distinguishing between two kinds of thought:
Thoughts of the first type are variously known as descriptive, de dicto,
conceptual, or notional thoughts. Thoughts of the second type are
known as singular, de re, purely referential, or relational thoughts.
(Jeshion 2010b, p. 2)
If singular thought were the same kind of thing as de re thought,
then the position I am trying to sketch in this paper would be im-
possible. For it is normal to describe a de re thought as one which
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essentially involves a relation to an existing object. As Tyler Burge
said in a classic paper, ‘a de re belief is a belief whose correct ascrip-
tion places the believer in an appropriate nonconceptual, contextual
relation to the objects the belief is about’ (Burge 1977, p. 51). So if
singular thoughts are de re then they must be object-dependent.
I think there is a connection between the idea of a singular
thought and the idea of a de re thought. But this connection does
not make singular thoughts object-dependent. To explain why I
need to say a little about what is meant by ‘de re thought’. Tradi-
tionally, the distinction between the de re and the de dicto is con-
ceived as a distinction in the relative scope in a sentence of a name
or a quantifier and some other operator or predicate in the sentence.
As such, it is a syntactic or a logical distinction. A recent survey arti-
cle defines ‘syntactically de re’ as follows:
A sentence is syntactically de re just in case it contains a pronoun or
free variable within the scope of an opacity verb that is anaphoric on
or bound by a singular term or quantifier outside the scope of that
verb. Otherwise, it is syntactically de dicto. (McKay and Nelson 2010)
So a claim of de re necessity is a claim concerning some thing that it
is necessarily so-and-so; a claim of de dicto necessity is a claim that
it is necessary that some thing is so-and-so. Claims about the de re
and the de dicto are claims about scope.
Contemporary discussion of the distinction between de re and de
dicto psychological states begins with Quine’s paper, ‘Quantifiers
and Propositional Attitudes’ (1956), where it is called the distinc-
tion between relational and notional senses of attitude verbs like
‘believe’. When I say that Oedipus believes that Jocasta is his wife, I
am giving a notional (de dicto) attribution of belief, whereas when I
say that Jocasta is such that Oedipus believes that she is his wife,
then I am giving a relational (de re) attribution. The terminology is
appropriate, since the second description relates one to the object
(res) specified outside the scope of ‘believes’.
It should be entirely uncontroversial that this distinction can be
made, and that we ascribe beliefs and other attitudes in both ways.
(Or more precisely, our commonsense psychological attitude ascrip-
tions can be represented or regimented in both kinds of way.) So if the
existence of de re attitudes is simply a matter of the truth of these de
re or relational attributions, then everyone should accept that there
are de re attitudes. But what has this got to do with singular thought?
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Despite the persistent association of singular thought with de re
thought, it seems to me that these are very different phenomena.
Moreover, this is true both on the orthodox conception of singular
thought and on the conception I am trying to develop here. On the
orthodox conception, a singular thought act is singular because it
has an object-dependent content. This content can either be a Russel-
lian singular proposition or a Fregean object-dependent Gedanke.
Clearly, such thoughts are attributed in de dicto attributions, the
standard propositional attitude attribution form. Singular proposi-
tions are intended to play the role of the propositions which are the
relata of propositional attitudes in the ordinary sense. There is no
need for them to be attributed in a de re way, though they can be.8
It might be said that even if the de re and the singular are not the
same thing, nonetheless any attribution of a singular thought entails
a de re or relational attribution. This will be true on the orthodox
view, since singular thoughts are object-dependent. So from any sin-
gular thought attribution of the form ‘S believes that …a…’ where a
is a singular term, we can infer both ‘a is such that S believes … of a’
and the existential generalization ‘there exists something x such that
S believes … of x’. For the orthodoxy, then, this is the link between
the singular and the de re.9 
However, if we approach the issue of singularity via the idea of
aiming to refer in thought to just one object, then not all apparently
singular thoughts will entail a de re thought ascription. This is illus-
trated by a nice example of Mark Sainsbury’s, when discussing
Quine’s distinction between the relational (de re) and the notional
(de dicto). Note that Sainsbury puts his point in terms of ‘specificity’,
but he could have used the word ‘singularity’ in the present sense:
Jack has envisaged a sloop in considerable detail, and has commis-
sioned full plans and given her a name: the Mary Jane. No other sloop
will do. Jack’s desire is specific, in that it fails the ‘any old sloop will
do’ test: he doesn’t want merely ‘relief from slooplessness’ … Yet some-
thing goes wrong and the Mary Jane is never built, and so never exists.
In this case, Jack’s desire has the specificity it would have had if it had
been relational, even though it is not relational: there is no sloop he
wants, no sloop that could satisfy his desire. (Sainsbury 2009, p. 127)
8 Hence McDowell’s 1984 paper is misleadingly titled ‘De Re Senses’.
9 I ignore here for simplicity the question of how we should understand quantification and
the ‘there is’ idiom in English. On this matter see McGinn (2002), Priest (2005), Azzouni
(2007).
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What Sainsbury’s example shows is that a thought can be singular
in my sense without entailing a de re attribution. And there can be
de re attributions which are not attributions of singular thoughts. If
there is a shortest spy, then the shortest spy is such that I believe of
him that he is a spy, merely in virtue of believing that there is a
shortest spy. I agree with those who say that this is not an attempt
to think about one particular object; it is a kind of general thought.
But the attribution is de re.10
There are those, like Burge (1977), who have developed substan-
tial theories about the way that thoughts are linked to their sur-
rounding contexts, and call these theories of ‘de re thoughts’. Of
course, one can use the terminology as one pleases, but I find this
use of ‘de re’ misleading, given the origin of the terminology and its
otherwise perfectly clear use in modality and attitude ascriptions. I
think it would be better for Burge to call his theory a theory of rela-
tional thought or intentionality.11
IV
Psychology and Semantics. The lesson of our discussion of de re
thought is this. It is undeniable that there are de re attributions of
singular thoughts and other psychological states. When someone
makes such an attribution they aim to relate the subject of the state
to some particular object, and they do this in a way that may be in-
different to the way that the subject conceptualizes the object. But
there is no reason to think that there is a distinctive kind of psycho-
logical state which is reported by attributions of this distinctive kind.
To say this is not to take sides in the debate over the reduction of
de re thought to de dicto. That is a matter of how different kinds of
attributions are related. I am interested rather in the psychological
reality reported by such attributions. One could treat the de re as ir-
reducible to the de dicto, and still reject the idea that this reflects a
distinction between two kinds of psychological state.
One could say an analogous thing about singular propositions.
10 This paragraph skates over complex issues about the doctrines (associated with David
Kaplan) of latitudinarianism and semantic intrumentalism. See Kaplan (1989) and Jeshion
(2010a) for discussion.
11 Burge makes it clear in his postscript to ‘Belief De Re’ that his concern is with a specific
kind of attitude, and not with a specific kind of attribution (Burge 2007, p. 65).
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We could accept that for some purposes, a psychological state could
be assigned a singular Russellian proposition as its content; for oth-
er purposes a state could be assigned a singular Fregean proposi-
tion; for other purposes a set of worlds. But this does not force us to
accept that there are different psychological episodes described by
these different relations. There really are these relations; they can be
appealed to for different explanatory or descriptive purposes; but
this is consistent with there being one psychological reality which
the relations pick out.
Which purposes could these be? Take the case of Oedipus again.
You might want to describe Oedipus’s desire to marry his mother by
using a singular proposition, perhaps a Russellian proposition which
contains Jocasta herself as a constituent. The reason you might do
this is to highlight the fact that it is the very same person he wants to
marry who gave birth to him. But of course, Oedipus didn’t see it
this way himself, since he was ignorant of this fact. So if we wanted
to highlight how things were from Oedipus’s point of view, we
should pick a propositional object that represents things more finely
than Russellian propositions do (for example, a Fregean Gedanke).
In the case of Vulcan, one would not use a singular proposition to
describe Le Verrier’s belief that Vulcan orbits the sun. For there is no
such proposition, since Vulcan does not exist. (I am assuming that
propositions exist only if their constituents do. Although this could
be questioned, I will not do so here.) So one would have to pick out
Le Verrier’s belief using some other kind of abstract object —for ex-
ample, by using a ‘gappy’ proposition (Braun 1993), or a Fregean
non-object-dependent Gedanke which contains a sense representing
Vulcan. Or one might abandon the apparatus of propositions alto-
gether and try to give a more minimalist semantics, for example by
using homophonic Davidsonian truth theories as theories of mean-
ing. Sainsbury (2005) does such a thing in his unified account of re-
ferring and non-referring names.
These projects are all semantic projects, in the sense that they at-
tempt to show how the truth conditions and truth-values of sentenc-
es are fixed (if at all) by the semantic properties of their parts and
their mode of combination. Theories typically do this by associating
some entities (semantic values) with the semantically significant
parts of sentences, and showing how the relations between these en-
tities determine truth conditions and how truth conditions deter-
mine a truth-value in a context (normally a world, time or speaker,
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depending on the theory). A semantics for propositional attitude
sentences typically (but not in every theory) associates a proposition
with the complement clause of the attitude ascription.
The role of propositions, on this conception, is to pick out or
model some aspect of a subject’s mental state. ‘Model’ here is meant
broadly in the way it is used in scientific theory and practice—as
one might model a cognitive process on a computer, or as one might
model a weather system, or population growth, and so on. Two fea-
tures of models are relevant here. The first is that models idealize.
They abstract away from the messy complexity of what is being
modelled. Propositions can idealize in this sense: for example, it is
common these days to attribute propositional contents to perceptual
experiences. When Alex Byrne (2005, §3.2) describes a subject’s vis-
ual experience as the experience of a blue book, and says this can be
represented as a Russellian proposition <o, blueness>, he is surely
idealizing away from everything else that is experienced at that time.
After all, no one simply experiences a blue book.12
The second feature is that a model has some properties which can
be mapped onto the properties of the modelled system in a way that
illuminates that system’s behaviour. So, for example, logical or in-
ferential relations between propositions can be used to model logi-
cal or inferential relations between beliefs. One could use this
feature of propositional models to predict what someone might do,
or to display normative facts: for example, how you should modify
your beliefs if you are going to be rational. So the use of proposi-
tions as models can extend beyond compositional semantics, into
decision theory and formal representations of rationality.
I propose that this is how we should think about relations to prop-
ositions in general, and relations to singular propositions in particu-
lar. If there are such propositions—and I do not deny that there
are—then there are relations between thinkers and these proposi-
tions, which hold in virtue of the fact that they are used to model psy-
chological states in a compositional semantics or a decision theory.
But it might be objected: how can someone hold that singular
thoughts can be relations to singular propositions, and yet deny the
object-dependence of singular thoughts? Surely if you accept that
there are relations to singular propositions, then you accept the or-
12 For more on how this picture of propositional attitudes applies to perception, see Crane
(forthcoming).
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thodox view of singular thought? The answer to this is that on the
view outlined here, the relation to a proposition is not a basic or
ground-level fact. It is a theoretical construct employed by semanti-
cists and others. On my view, you do not give a fundamental expla-
nation of a mental act by saying it is a relation to a proposition.
This is a description of the mental act, useful for some purposes.
But, as we learned from our discussion of de re thought, there is a
distinction between the mental act itself and descriptions of the act.
It is for this reason that we can say both that a singular thought
can be described as a relation to a singular proposition, and that the
episode so described could be what it is whether or not the object
(and therefore the singular proposition) had existed. Conversely,
some singular thought episodes cannot be described as relations to
singular propositions, because their objects do not exist. But the
psychological episode is of a kind that could have been described by
a singular proposition, if the object in question had existed.13
The view outlined here could be called ‘psychologistic’ in the
sense that it looks to the psychological facts for the fundamental ex-
planation of thought.14 It contrasts with a semantic approach to the
psychological, which attempts to give a systematic theory of attribu-
tions of thoughts and other attitudes. As noted above, semanticists
have employed various different kinds of abstract objects in their ac-
counts of attitude attributions. There is no clear consensus about
when such attributions report genuinely singular thoughts. Rather
than conclude that the category of singular thought is hopelessly
vague, I prefer to look instead at the psychological reality that these
attributions report in their various ways.
It is for this reason that I agree with François Recanati, when he
writes:
Personally, I think it’s a bad idea to start from attitude reports [in char-
acterizing singular thought], given the complexity of their semantics
and their high level of context-sensitivity. We should rather start from
the theory of thought (and in particular, the distinction between singu-
lar and general thoughts) and use elements from that theory, along
13 For a description of a similar position in connection with the singular content of percep-
tual experience, see Martin (2002, p. 198), to which I am indebted.
14 Jeshion calls her somewhat similar view ‘cognitivism’ (2010a, p. 129). I prefer ‘psychol-
ogism’ because of the historical connection with the view rejected by Frege. Psychologism
about logic and semantics are untenable; but psychologism about the psychological is surely
on the right lines; see Crane (forthcoming).
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with a number of other ingredients, in trying to understand the multi-
faceted phenomenon of de re attitude reports. (Recanati 2010, p. 168)
What Recanati means by not ‘starting’ from attitude reports is that
we should not let our conception of what a singular thought is be
determined only by the form of a certain kind of report (for exam-
ple, the availability of existential quantification into the attitude
context). Our starting point should rather be the contrast between
singular and general episodes of thinking. I have described this in
terms of a thinker aiming to refer in thought to some particular ob-
ject. We then should use whatever resources and data we have to il-
luminate this phenomenon. The datum I have been examining here
is the fact that people can aim to refer in thought to an object that,
as a matter of fact, does not exist.
V
The Singularity of Singular Thought. A psychologistic approach to
thought locates the singularity of singular thought in the psycholog-
ical or cognitive role of singular thought episodes. What this ap-
proach must then do is to explain what makes these episodes
genuinely singular. In the final section of this paper I will outline
what such an explanation might look like.
I assume here that thought episodes are representations. For any
representation, there is a distinction between features of the repre-
sentation itself and features of what is represented (its content). As
explained above, the orthodoxy explains singularity in terms of fea-
tures of content: the object of thought features in (is a constituent
of, or is determined by) the thought’s propositional content. The
psychologistic approach, by contrast, explains singularity in terms
of features of the representation (the thought episode) itself. What
features of the representation are relevant to singularity?
To appreciate why singular thoughts are not general thoughts in
disguise, we should consider the well-known arguments against the
descriptive theory of names. The central idea here is that a name-like
representation retains its ability to refer to its bearer independently of
any specific general information that the user of the name holds to be
true of its bearer. The user can succeed in referring to the bearer of the
name ‘N’ even if (a) they do not hold general beliefs which uniquely
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identify N, and (b) the information they do hold is true of someone
other than N. This I take to be one of Kripke’s central insights.
The distinction I want to derive from these ideas of Kripke’s is
this: we can distinguish between the representation itself and the
body of general information associated by the speaker with the rep-
resentation. I find it useful, as many do, to think of the relevant men-
tal representations as mental files (see, inter alia, Perry 1980; Bach
1987, pp. 34–7; Forbes 1990; Jeshion 2010a; Recanati 2010). When
we form a representation of some object, we ‘open a file’ on that ob-
ject. We then come to store certain information in the file. We should
not think of the information in the file as the meaning of the name or
other expression which we use to express the thought in question.
The meaning of a term is something which is given by a correct se-
mantic account of that part of the language. What a term means in a
public language may be something which goes beyond any informa-
tion a thinker may have about the referent of the term, and the infor-
mation a thinker has may be far richer than the meaning.
What makes a file a singular file rather than a general one? Here I
can only sketch an answer.15 What is relevant to generality is not
that as a matter of fact the information is true of many things, but
the fact that a thinker can make sense of it being true of many things
(or of different things in different possible situations). Conversely,
what is relevant to singularity is not the fact that the information in
one’s file is true of just one thing, but that one cannot make sense of
it as being true of many things. I can conceive of more than one
thing being a natural satellite of the earth, even though there is just
one; but I cannot conceive of more than one thing being the moon.
My file associated with ‘the moon’ cannot contain the information
that more than one thing is the moon.
What is crucial is how I am disposed to treat new information as-
sociated with the object of my thought. My file for the moon con-
tains the information natural satellite of the earth. If I came to
believe that the earth has more than one satellite, I would not simply
add this information to the moon file, but I would open another file.
15 As Jody Azzouni points out in his reply to this paper (2011) this answer will not distin-
guish adequately between singular and plural representations or files. I acknowledge that
Azzouni is right that this distinction needs to be made, and that my account as it stands does
not make it. I hope that the essential idea described here can be modified to accommodate
Azzouni’s criticisms. But for obvious reasons, what I present here is the account to which
Azzouni is responding.
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My file for the moon (the real actual satellite) would now contain
the information that it is not the only satellite of the earth, but I
now have another file which also contains this information.
Suppose there are two twins, Ryan and Brian, whom I think are
the same person. I have just one file, which contains information
from each of them. When I come to realize that they are two and
learn their names, I do not just add this information to the file I
have; rather, my files ‘split’ and I associate one with one name and
one with the other. I may not have sufficient information in each file
to distinguish one from the other; but the important thing is that I
have distinct files.
Contrast this with a general idea that I might have, say, the idea
of a twin. When I discover that Ryan and Brian are twins, my ‘twin’
file (containing all the information I hold about twins and what it is
to be a twin) does not split; the file remains as it was. What it is to
aim in thought at one particular object, then, is a matter of how one
is disposed to treat new information about an object and how this
affects the identity of the files associated with the various objects
one encounters. The cognitive role of singular thought—the literali-
zation of the metaphor of ‘purporting’—is here explained in terms
of the nature of the mental files which collect the information we as-
sociate with the things we think about.16
Some theorists who think of genuine singular thought as object-
dependent have come to accept that there is a sense in which
thoughts about the non-existent may exhibit something like singu-
larity. Recanati, for example, thinks that the content of a genuine
singular thought is a singular proposition (2010, p. 142), and also
defends a mental file approach to the mechanisms of thinking (he
calls them ‘singular thought-vehicles’). On Recanati’s view, a singu-
lar thought-vehicle may be tokened without the subject having a sin-
gular thought, if the subject is not acquainted with the object the
thought is about, or if there is no such object (Recanati 2010,
p. 170). Acquaintance is what makes a singular thought-vehicle the
vehicle of a genuine singular thought: so ‘the conditions on singular
16 Much more needs to be said about the distinctive functions of mental files, which have
been the subject of investigation by psychologists and philosophers. Particularly relevant
here is Treisman (1988), Kahneman and Treisman (1984), and Scholl (2002). Of the many
remaining philosophical tasks for the theory sketched here is an account of what it means to
say that people are thinking about the same or different objects of thought, and a solution
to Geach’s puzzle of ‘intentional identity’ (Geach 1967).
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thought content are more stringent than those on singular thought-
vehicles’ (2010, p. 185).
What Recanati is calling vehicles I am calling thought episodes;
and we both think of these in terms of mental files. So it might seem
as if the issue between us is terminological, and at one point Reca-
nati implies as much himself:
[N]othing is to prevent a theorist from using ‘singular thought’ in the
sense of ‘singular thought-vehicle’. I have no quarrel with the claim
that Leverrier entertained a ‘singular thought’ thus understood, when
he said to himself ‘The discovery of Vulcan will make me famous’.
(Recanati 2010, p. 185)
In a similar way, Taylor (2010, pp. 77–9) distinguishes between a
thought episode’s being objectual (apt for having a singular referent)
and its being objective (actually having such a referent). He agrees that
thoughts can be objectual without being objective, and comments:
There is no harm in calling states of this sort [thoughts without refer-
ents] thoughts or singular thoughts as long as one recognizes that the
singularity of such a thought is exhausted by its mere purport of sin-
gularity. (Taylor 2010, p. 97 n.24, my emphasis)
What it is for a thought to have ‘mere purport of singularity’ is what
I have been trying to describe here. Although I agree with what a lot
of Recanati and Taylor say, I cannot put the facts entirely in their
terms, and to that extent the issue is not terminological. Recanati
describes thought episodes as ‘vehicles’ and his view of singular
thought content means that when Le Verrier says to himself ‘The
discovery of Vulcan will make me famous’, the thought has no con-
tent. Yet the content of someone’s thought is what they are thinking,
and how can it be that Le Verrier was not thinking anything, merely
airing an empty ‘vehicle’? Similarly, Taylor describes a thought’s
purported singularity as an aspect of the ‘form’ of a thought rather
than its content. But what Le Verrier thinks, I maintain, cannot be
characterized simply in terms of its ‘form’, as if what was going on
in him was something without content, in the sense of what is
thought. (These are not supposed to be arguments against Taylor
and Recanati, only descriptions of my disagreement with them.)
By contrast, the psychologistic view of singular thought recogniz-
es that Le Verrier was genuinely thinking something, a thought with
as much content as any thought has. This thought can be modelled
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by relating it to a proposition, though not to a singular proposition;
and the fact that there is no such singular proposition does not in
any way threaten its status as a complete thought, nor as a singular
thought. What Le Verrier was thinking was not just mere ‘form’ or
an empty ‘vehicle’. In fact, from a psychological or phenomenologi-
cal point of view these ideas are hard to make literal sense of. The
difference between the psychologistic view and these more orthodox
singular thought theorists is substantial, not terminological.
VI
Conclusion. I claim that there is an intuitive distinction between
thinking about the world in a general way and aiming to refer in
thought to a specific object: a singular thought. There are many cases
where thinkers appear to be having singular thoughts in this sense
even though the object of the thought does not exist: aiming to refer to
a specific object in this case fails to ‘hit’ the target object. I believe we
should take these phenomena at face value: someone can think in the
singular way about something even when that thing does not exist.
I have argued that there are no compelling reasons for thinking
that a distinctive epistemic relation to an object is required for sin-
gular thought in the intuitive sense, and nor need singular thought
be given in de re ascriptions. But the phenomenon of de re thought
ascriptions shows that we must distinguish between the various
ways of describing the thought’s content and the thought episode it-
self, and therefore between a semantics which models thoughts in
terms of relations to propositions and a psychological theory of
thought episodes. In the case of singular thought, these psychologi-
cal episodes are best construed in terms of mental files, whose cog-
nitive role consists partly in the way they respond to information (or
supposed information) about the identity of the object referred to.
In this way, we can understand the singularity of singular thought in
terms of a cognitive role which can be played out even in the case
where the thought has no referent.17
17 I have benefited from discussions of these ideas in Cambridge and Dublin, and I would
like to thank especially Tim Button, Rob Trueman, Peter Simons and Richard Woodward.
For written comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am deeply indebted to Katalin Far-
kas, Jeff Kaplan, Stephen Neale and Lee Walters.
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